Jordan: Jordanian women face an unequal fight for equal rights
Source:
The Daily Star Lebanon During the past 10 years, there have been attempts to amend laws related to the rights of women in order to enhance their status and social and economic role, and protect them from violations and violence, including what are known as "honor crimes."
A number of political actors and civil society institutions have been involved in these campaigns, which were supported by the royal family and successive Jordanian governments.
Yet these efforts have shown very limited progress, meeting strong resistance from traditional and religious actors who control the Jordanian Parliament and impose their cultural and behavioral practices upon wide sectors of Jordanian society. These campaigns have also encountered political obstacles that can be traced in part to Jordan's demographic structure.
Continuous efforts by Jordanian women's organizations, supported by human rights activists and the Jordanian political leadership, have produced some amendments to marriage and divorce laws. The legal minimum age for the marriage of girls was raised to 18 years, and women obtained the right of divorce, or kholu, by which they could start divorce procedures based on certain conditions such as restitution of all dowry money.
However this amendment, which was greatly criticized by conservatives, has not maintained women's rights during the marriage itself. The legislators disregarded the "added value" of a woman's contribution in building up the family and providing its needs, whether by working outside the home or as a housewife.
During the past few years, several attempts to amend Article 340 of the Penal Code have failed. This article sometimes provides a "lawful" excuse for criminals who assault women or murder them to protect "family honor." The murderer in an honor crime, usually one of the victim's closest relatives, receives a commuted sentence or several months' imprisonment. The result is that 15-25 women continue to be murdered annually in Jordan. Despite civil and religious campaigns against such crimes, Jordanian society, yielding to traditional and religious influence, continues to sympathize with honor crime murderers and finds excuses and justifications for their act.
There can be no doubt that the spread of Islam in Jordanian society over the past two or three decades has contributed to the formation of a sociopolitical front opposing legislative initiatives by Jordanian civil society and its active women's organizations. The Muslim Brotherhood has grown stronger and has come to control a large number of active non-governmental organizations, such as professional unions and student councils. Its infrastructure of educational, service, cultural and other social institutions extends to cover a broad section of society, including those people living in the poorest areas.
During the past 20 years there has also been an increase in the influence of a Salafist movement that takes a radical approach toward social, civil and cultural issues. The various trends of this movement are concentrated among the native Jordanian population, while the Muslim Brotherhood has focused on the Palestinian refugee camps and neighborhoods of Jordanians of Palestinian origin.
In seeking to contain the impact of the escalating power of religion, successive Jordanian governments have since 1993 adopted a "one vote law" and distributed parliamentary seats among governorates and electorates with the aim of achieving two connected objectives: first, to prevent Islamists from reaching too deeply into Parliament and obtaining a majority; and second, to guarantee the "Jordanian identity" of Parliament and contain the representation of Jordanians of Palestinian origin within certain limits.
Yet the outcome of this policy in the social, cultural and civil spheres has totally contradicted the intent of the regime. The "one vote law" has produced three successive parliaments controlled by conservative and traditional pro-government political actors who have allied themselves with the Muslim Brotherhood and related religious groups, thereby rendering it difficult to enact legislation awarding women equal rights.
The latest attempt at such legislation was made by Queen Rania, who sought to amend the Jordanian Nationality Law so as to give Jordanian women married to non-Jordanians the right to obtain Jordanian nationality for their children. This effort faced strong resistance from conservative Jordanians who feared the ramifications of such an amendment on the sensitive demographics of the country: some sources estimated the proposed amendment would grant immediate Jordanian nationality to more than 50,000 Palestinians. In the end the Cabinet was authorized to grant nationality to children of Jordanian women married to non-Jordanians, but only on a case-by-case basis.
Here we see all the elements involved in the debate over the status of women: the campaign to grant Jordanian women their rights as guaranteed by international charters; political, social and cultural complications related to the development of religious and socially conservative trends; and the demographic issues peculiar to Jordan.
During the past 20 years there has also been an increase in the influence of a Salafist movement that takes a radical approach toward social, civil and cultural issues. The various trends of this movement are concentrated among the native Jordanian population, while the Muslim Brotherhood has focused on the Palestinian refugee camps and neighborhoods of Jordanians of Palestinian origin.
In seeking to contain the impact of the escalating power of religion, successive Jordanian governments have since 1993 adopted a "one vote law" and distributed parliamentary seats among governorates and electorates with the aim of achieving two connected objectives: first, to prevent Islamists from reaching too deeply into Parliament and obtaining a majority; and second, to guarantee the "Jordanian identity" of Parliament and contain the representation of Jordanians of Palestinian origin within certain limits.
Yet the outcome of this policy in the social, cultural and civil spheres has totally contradicted the intent of the regime. The "one vote law" has produced three successive parliaments controlled by conservative and traditional pro-government political actors who have allied themselves with the Muslim Brotherhood and related religious groups, thereby rendering it difficult to enact legislation awarding women equal rights.
The latest attempt at such legislation was made by Queen Rania, who sought to amend the Jordanian Nationality Law so as to give Jordanian women married to non-Jordanians the right to obtain Jordanian nationality for their children. This effort faced strong resistance from conservative Jordanians who feared the ramifications of such an amendment on the sensitive demographics of the country: some sources estimated the proposed amendment would grant immediate Jordanian nationality to more than 50,000 Palestinians. In the end the Cabinet was authorized to grant nationality to children of Jordanian women married to non-Jordanians, but only on a case-by-case basis.
Here we see all the elements involved in the debate over the status of women: the campaign to grant Jordanian women their rights as guaranteed by international charters; political, social and cultural complications related to the development of religious and socially conservative trends; and the demographic issues peculiar to Jordan.
Oraib al-Rantawi is director of the Al-Quds Center for Political Studies in Amman. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.
Continuous efforts by Jordanian women's organizations, supported by human rights activists and the Jordanian political leadership, have produced some amendments to marriage and divorce laws. The legal minimum age for the marriage of girls was raised to 18 years, and women obtained the right of divorce, or kholu, by which they could start divorce procedures based on certain conditions such as restitution of all dowry money.
However this amendment, which was greatly criticized by conservatives, has not maintained women's rights during the marriage itself. The legislators disregarded the "added value" of a woman's contribution in building up the family and providing its needs, whether by working outside the home or as a housewife.
During the past few years, several attempts to amend Article 340 of the Penal Code have failed. This article sometimes provides a "lawful" excuse for criminals who assault women or murder them to protect "family honor." The murderer in an honor crime, usually one of the victim's closest relatives, receives a commuted sentence or several months' imprisonment. The result is that 15-25 women continue to be murdered annually in Jordan. Despite civil and religious campaigns against such crimes, Jordanian society, yielding to traditional and religious influence, continues to sympathize with honor crime murderers and finds excuses and justifications for their act.
There can be no doubt that the spread of Islam in Jordanian society over the past two or three decades has contributed to the formation of a sociopolitical front opposing legislative initiatives by Jordanian civil society and its active women's organizations. The Muslim Brotherhood has grown stronger and has come to control a large number of active non-governmental organizations, such as professional unions and student councils. Its infrastructure of educational, service, cultural and other social institutions extends to cover a broad section of society, including those people living in the poorest areas.
During the past 20 years there has also been an increase in the influence of a Salafist movement that takes a radical approach toward social, civil and cultural issues. The various trends of this movement are concentrated among the native Jordanian population, while the Muslim Brotherhood has focused on the Palestinian refugee camps and neighborhoods of Jordanians of Palestinian origin.
In seeking to contain the impact of the escalating power of religion, successive Jordanian governments have since 1993 adopted a "one vote law" and distributed parliamentary seats among governorates and electorates with the aim of achieving two connected objectives: first, to prevent Islamists from reaching too deeply into Parliament and obtaining a majority; and second, to guarantee the "Jordanian identity" of Parliament and contain the representation of Jordanians of Palestinian origin within certain limits.
Yet the outcome of this policy in the social, cultural and civil spheres has totally contradicted the intent of the regime. The "one vote law" has produced three successive parliaments controlled by conservative and traditional pro-government political actors who have allied themselves with the Muslim Brotherhood and related religious groups, thereby rendering it difficult to enact legislation awarding women equal rights.
The latest attempt at such legislation was made by Queen Rania, who sought to amend the Jordanian Nationality Law so as to give Jordanian women married to non-Jordanians the right to obtain Jordanian nationality for their children. This effort faced strong resistance from conservative Jordanians who feared the ramifications of such an amendment on the sensitive demographics of the country: some sources estimated the proposed amendment would grant immediate Jordanian nationality to more than 50,000 Palestinians. In the end the Cabinet was authorized to grant nationality to children of Jordanian women married to non-Jordanians, but only on a case-by-case basis.
Here we see all the elements involved in the debate over the status of women: the campaign to grant Jordanian women their rights as guaranteed by international charters; political, social and cultural complications related to the development of religious and socially conservative trends; and the demographic issues peculiar to Jordan.
During the past 20 years there has also been an increase in the influence of a Salafist movement that takes a radical approach toward social, civil and cultural issues. The various trends of this movement are concentrated among the native Jordanian population, while the Muslim Brotherhood has focused on the Palestinian refugee camps and neighborhoods of Jordanians of Palestinian origin.
In seeking to contain the impact of the escalating power of religion, successive Jordanian governments have since 1993 adopted a "one vote law" and distributed parliamentary seats among governorates and electorates with the aim of achieving two connected objectives: first, to prevent Islamists from reaching too deeply into Parliament and obtaining a majority; and second, to guarantee the "Jordanian identity" of Parliament and contain the representation of Jordanians of Palestinian origin within certain limits.
Yet the outcome of this policy in the social, cultural and civil spheres has totally contradicted the intent of the regime. The "one vote law" has produced three successive parliaments controlled by conservative and traditional pro-government political actors who have allied themselves with the Muslim Brotherhood and related religious groups, thereby rendering it difficult to enact legislation awarding women equal rights.
The latest attempt at such legislation was made by Queen Rania, who sought to amend the Jordanian Nationality Law so as to give Jordanian women married to non-Jordanians the right to obtain Jordanian nationality for their children. This effort faced strong resistance from conservative Jordanians who feared the ramifications of such an amendment on the sensitive demographics of the country: some sources estimated the proposed amendment would grant immediate Jordanian nationality to more than 50,000 Palestinians. In the end the Cabinet was authorized to grant nationality to children of Jordanian women married to non-Jordanians, but only on a case-by-case basis.
Here we see all the elements involved in the debate over the status of women: the campaign to grant Jordanian women their rights as guaranteed by international charters; political, social and cultural complications related to the development of religious and socially conservative trends; and the demographic issues peculiar to Jordan.
Oraib al-Rantawi is director of the Al-Quds Center for Political Studies in Amman. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.
